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Abstract This paper analyses the patterns of bureaucratic tenure of the German
federal bureaucratic elite. It applies a delegation theory and a Public Service Bargain
perspective and argues that partisan and professional determinants influence the
bureaucratic tenure. Our survival analysis shows that partisan features matter, yet dif-
ferently than suggested by existing research: top officials affiliated with the minister’s
party have a significant higher risk of dismissal than those affiliated to other parties and
non-partisans. In contrast, the temporal proximity between ministerial and top official
appointments has no significant effects on bureaucratic tenure. In addition, professional
determinants shape bureaucratic survival. Whereas the minister’s office experience is
insignificant for bureaucratic survival, the top official’s office experience has significant
and negative effects on the risk of dismissal: individuals with prior experience in
managing bureaucratic apparatuses survive longer than those without such office
experience. We conclude that German ministers are more likely to dismiss senior civil
servants due to their unsatisfying office experience than their incongruent or lacking
partisan affiliation.
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Introduction
A common way for politicians to control the permanent bureaucracy is to appoint
top officials balancing their political requests with bureaucratic expertise (Dogan,
1975; Aberbach et al, 1981; Page and Wright, 1999). Yet ministers are limited in
monitoring how senior civil servants carry out their important role in executive
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politics. Public administration scholars argue that administrative institutions shape
successful delegation, either considered as rather hierarchical interactions (Rouban,
2003; Dahlstro¨m and Niklasson, 2013) or as public service bargains (Hood, 2002;
Hood and Lodge, 2006). Coalition researchers emphasise the relevance of political
parties for the scope and depth of patronage in civil service systems as a control and
a reward mechanism at the bureaucratic top level (Kopecky´ et al, 2012). From both
perspectives, party membership of senior officials facilitates interactions because it
informs on preferences and loyalty. However, we lack systematic evidence about
the relevance of partisan features for the delegation between ministers and top
officials, particularly in contrast to other determinants. This paper aims to provide
such a systematic analysis, examining the German federal bureaucratic elite as a
crucial case most likely to experience partisan and professional determinants in
bureaucratic survival.
This paper adds to the scholarly debate on the politics of bureaucratic elite
delegation in three ways. Firstly, it applies a theoretical argument from the
delegation literature that is increasingly used for parliamentary systems (e.g.
Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014) but stresses also the importance of actors’ capabilities
involved in the delegation relationship. Secondly, it focuses on bureaucratic tenure
as a very suitable phenomenon for studying the partisan influence on the delegation
between ministers and top officials. The literature on bureaucratic survival is
growing (Wood and Marchbanks III, 2008; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014) but many
studies on bureaucratic elites focus on their selection and turnover (Bertelli, 2007;
Lewis, 2007, 2008). Lastly, this paper analyses bureaucratic tenure in the German
federal bureaucracy as a crucial case where partisan features are expected to matter
alongside other determinants because senior civil service positions are rather
uncontested areas for political appointments and officeholders are permitted to join
political parties while at the same time the German bureaucracy is regarded to
follow the Weberian ideal type emphasising the relevance of expertise and
professionalism at all levels (Derlien, 2003).
Following delegation theory and the public service bargain perspective, we argue
that partisan features as well as the office capabilities of ministers and top officials
influence bureaucratic tenure. Our survival analysis shows that the partisan
affiliation of top officials and their distinct office experience have significant effects
on their tenure. By contrast, the temporal distance between ministerial and top
executive appointments as well as the minister’s office experience are less relevant.
More importantly, the affiliation to the minister’s party shows opposite effects on
bureaucratic survival than argued in the existing literature, i.e. officeholders
affiliated with the minister’s party are more likely to be removed than those lacking
such an affiliation. Although this result contradicts existing scholarship on public
managers’ survival (e.g. Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014), it can also serve as an indicator
for the relevance of links between ministerial and top official careers – and senior
civil servants affiliated with the minister’s party may fail earlier than others
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because their political patrons leave office. Moreover, it shows that German
ministers are more likely to dismiss senior civil servants because of their deficient
office experience rather than due to an incongruent or lacking partisan affiliation.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the theoretical
argument, based upon the delegation literature but emphasising also actor-oriented
characteristics. The third section outlines the research design and data used for this
analysis. The fourth section presents the empirical findings on bureaucratic survival
in the German federal bureaucracy. The paper concludes that bureaucratic tenure is
influenced by the party affiliation as well as the office experience of top officials,
revealing the importance of both partisan and professional determinants for
bureaucratic survival.
Theoretical Framework
It is almost a truism in comparative politics and public administration research that
ministers and top officials are interdependent, as principals and agents in the chain
of delegation in democratic systems (Huber, 2000) or as negotiation partners in a
public service bargain (PSB; Hood, 2002; Hood and Lodge, 2006). In the classical
repetition of delegation theory, ministers as principals aim to diminish potential
conflicts of interest and asymmetries of information by selecting top officials as
their agents that are compliant to their preferences (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991).
From this perspective, the dismissal of senior civil servants is understood as the
ultimate sanction for non-compliant behaviour or as a way to make room for a new
agent with comparatively stronger compliance to the minister’s needs (see Bertelli,
2007; Lewis, 2007, 2008; Dahlstro¨m and Niklasson, 2013).
The PSB perspective pays more attention to the two actors and their skills and
capabilities, claiming that the sanctions-and-rewards orientation may be less
pronounced than predicted by the delegation literature. Although such ‘agency type
bargains’ may exist, intrinsic motivations as well as dominant role perceptions of
civil servants as guarantors of the common good are argued to diminish potential
interest conflicts to an extent where competence and loyalty are equally if not more
important goods that are conveyed in ‘trustee type bargains’ (Hood, 2002; Hood
and Lodge, 2006, pp. 24–25). Here, loyalty not only relates to the minister but also
to the distinct office. Furthermore, this approach emphasises the occurrence of
blame games and thus adds another motive for bureaucratic dismissal, namely to
pin blame and, inter alia, secure ministerial survival.
Following delegation theory, ministers are interested in selecting and keeping
top officials for controlling the permanent bureaucracy according to their
preferences, which can be best expressed by an affiliation to their own party
(Mu¨ller, 2000; Lewis, 2007, 2008). These dynamics are further strengthened in
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parliamentary systems with changing coalition partners where cabinets are
collectives of individual ministers leading ministerial departments (Andeweg,
1997). So far, the effects of these dynamics on delegation relationships within the
executive have been studied in the context of divided government (Epstein and
O’Halloran, 1996, 1999; Lewis, 2007, 2008). If we assume that top officials are not
only appointed for patronage but also for controlling the permanent bureaucracy, it
is plausible that ministers influence bureaucratic tenure in order to reduce their own
agency loss, even though the coalition party may face these consequences
(similarly: Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014). By contrast, officeholders affiliated to another
governing party (in coalition governments), an opposition party or without any
party affiliation are more likely to depart from the minister’s preferences and thus
are less suitable agents for controlling the permanent bureaucracy. In a similar vein,
the patronage debate argues that ministers and top officials engage in patron–client
relationships in order to exchange office rewards with partisan loyalty (Meyer-
Sahling and Ja´ger, 2012; Kopecky´ et al, 2012).
From the PSB perspective, favouring top officials affiliated to the minister’s
party can be regarded as a ‘party-political bias in selection’ (Hood, 2002, p. 161),
diluting the established bargains over loyalty, competency and rewards. Disregard
which type of bargain is in use, the partisan alignment of top officials turns
attention towards partisan loyalty and can be argued to be rewarded by ministers,
e.g. with bureaucratic tenure (see Peters and Pierre, 2004). It follows that top
officials affiliated to the minister’s party should face a lower risk to be removed
than those lacking such an affiliation. Hence,
H1 Top officials are less likely to be removed if they are affiliated with the
minister’s party.
In addition, the patronage debate highlights the explanatory relevance of
personal allegiances shaping the delegation between ministers and top officials.
These authors claim that office rewards are also given to individuals because of
their personal ties to their political masters (Meyer-Sahling, 2006; Kopecky´ et al,
2012). As a consequence, top officials with strong personal loyalties are argued to
survive longer in office than those without personal allegiances to the minister.
Also the PSB perspective discusses personal loyalties and stresses that these may
affect bureaucratic survival up to a point where it is fully linked to the minister and
her fate in government, thus reiterating the argument made above that interactions
between ministerial and bureaucratic careers shape bureaucratic survival (Hood and
Lodge, 2006, p. 112).
The scholarly debate on patronage and politicisation is still discussing reasonable
measurements for such personal connections (see Kopecky´ et al, 2012). We follow
the politicisation debate and argue that the temporal proximity between ministerial
and bureaucratic appointments may not only indicate politicisation in general but
also such personal loyalties in particular. To be sure, ministers may be motivated to
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appoint personal allies throughout their ministerial tenure. However, it is
reasonable to assume that patronage appointments related to personal ties are
most likely after the minister came into office, inter alia because ministers cannot
predict how long they will serve and thus how many opportunities for such
appointments they may have. Thus,
H2 Top officials are less likely to be removed if they are appointed shortly after
the minister took office.
The delegation literature highlights not only the principal’s costs in screening and
selecting agents but also her costs in monitoring the agent’s behaviour (Kiewiet and
McCubbins, 1991; Wood and Marchbanks III, 2008). The usual response to these
costs is relying upon other actors and their monitoring of the agent, either on a regular
or situational basis (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). In addition, the checks and
balances in a political system may provide additional means to ensure the agent’s
compliance. For the delegation betweenministers and top officials, one could discuss
similar means for monitoring the compliance of senior civil servants to the minister’s
needs, once the delegation has been established. Next to other ministry officials in the
same portfolio as well as other senior civil servants from other portfolios offering
rather situational monitoring, audit offices provide regular accounts of bureaucrat’s
behaviour. However, one of themost straightforwardmeans is arguably theminister’s
own capability to monitor bureaucratic behaviour. One may argue that ministers’
capacities are heavily spent on other business than monitoring their immediate
bureaucratic subordinates (Mu¨ller-Rommel, 1984). Yet, ministers differ in their
exercising of political leadership and particularly their individual capacities to
formulate their demands towards senior civil servants but likewise to assess whether
these demands have beenmet (see Peters andHelms, 2012). Ifministers gathered such
experience in taking political responsibility for bureaucratic organisations prior to the
top official’s appointment, they can draw upon this experience in monitoring their
agent and are better equipped of detecting non-compliant behaviour themselves,
which they may sanction with bureaucratic dismissal. In contrast, ministers without
office experience have to rely upon othermonitoringmechanismswhichmaywork as
sufficient but do come with additional costs.
So far, the wide-ranging literature on ministerial selection discusses ministers’
office experience primarily ‘upwards’, i.e. ministers are examined as agents
selected by political parties or prime ministers as their principals and their office
experience is argued to satisfy requests emerging from the negotiations between
governing parties over offices and policies as well as from prime ministers
balancing their cabinets (Dowding and Dumont, 2009). The similar ‘downwards’
effect of office experience within the general chain of delegation has not been
discussed so far, but is likewise reasonable: in our study ministers’ office
experience shapes their delegation interactions with top officials, facilitating
monitoring and increasing the likelihood of bureaucratic dismissal. Therefore,
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H3 Top officials are more likely to be removed if the minister holds office
experience.
The office experience of senior civil servants can be regarded as particularly
relevant to ministers, especially if we presume that ministers aim to control the
permanent bureaucracy with their appointments at the top echelons of ministerial
departments. Given the primacy of office experience for bureaucratic authority
(Weber, 1921/1980) and the importance of knowledge over bureaucratic structures
and procedures for running the machinery of government, top officials with such
skills are arguably requested by cabinet ministers who are held accountable for
their ministries (Page and Wright, 1999).
In a similar vein, the PSB perspective discusses actor capabilities with a focus on
the skills, abilities and experiences of civil servants (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 86).
They argue that top officials exchange their office experience with ministers in
‘competency bargains’ and as the notion of a bargain already suggests, ministers
demand the office competencies in order to compensate for shortage of their own
competencies in this regard. It is reasonable to assume that senior civil servants
holding strong office experience are, by and large, more attractive officeholders to
ministers. Consequently, we assume that the top civil servants’ office experience in
managing bureaucratic apparatuses is a major determinant of bureaucratic survival.
Hence,
H4 Top officials are less likely to be removed if they hold office experience.
Research Design and Data
To study the relevance of partisan effects in comparison to other determinants for
survival at the top level of ministerial bureaucracies, we analyse the tenure of
senior civil servants in Germany between 1949 and 2013. In Germany, cabinet
ministers exercise individual ministerial responsibility, providing them with wide-
ranging responsibility for their own portfolio (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1975). This
principle covers also the selection and de-selection of senior civil servants,
although formally the government decides about the appointments (§15 GOBReg
[2002]; see below). Moreover, an analysis throughout the complete post-war period
in Germany allows variation in the partisan composition of governments, covering
the traditional coalitions between one of the two catch-all parties CDU/CSU or
SPD with one of the smaller parties, the FDP or the Greens as well as the two
Grand Coalitions between CDU/CSU and SPD during the late 1960s and the mid-
2000s.
The appointment of ‘political civil servants’ (politische Beamte) in Germany
dates back to the 1848 revolution in Prussia when administrative officials at the top
level were politically appointed because the newly established parliament aimed to
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increase its political control over a permanent bureaucracy that was allegedly
disconnected to the new government’s political programme (Kugele, 1976,
pp. 20–24; Derlien, 1996, p. 157). This cadre of political appointees was re-
introduced at the top level of the German federal ministerial bureaucracy in spring
1950 after severe discussions in cabinet, also due to Chancellor Adenauer’s strong
requests, later exerting considerable influence on the first recruitments (Wengst,
1984, pp. 150, 157). Soon, the individual cabinet ministers became involved in the
recruitment and dismissal of political civil servants in federal ministries, although
all appointments must be formally submitted to the federal government for
approval in advance (§15 GOBReg [2002]; Goetz, 1997, p. 771). More importantly,
these political civil servants can be put on temporary retirement at any point in time
and without justification because their senior position inside the federal bureau-
cracy is argued to require their full agreement with the goals of the government
(Kugele, 1976, pp. 10–11; Steinkemper, 1979; Mayntz, 1984, p. 183).
Since 1953, the members of this group of political civil servants are defined by
the Federal Civil Service Law, comprising approx. 150 officeholders (§54 BBG
[2009]), including all administrative state secretaries and division heads in federal
ministries, high-ranking civil servants in the foreign service, ambassadors and top
officials in the intelligence services (§54 BBG [2009]). Political civil servants are
not appointed as such but move into this special category by promotion or
recruitment to the corresponding pay grade and rank (Kugele, 1976; Steinkemper,
1979; Mayntz, 1984, pp. 183–184). By and large, the majority of top officials is
recruited by internal promotion and thus enjoys considerable office experience in
running the bureaucratic apparatus (Derlien, 2003).
In practice, the turnover of German administrative state secretaries after changes
in the party composition of federal governments appears not to follow a series of
‘nights of the long knives’ (see Table 1). Whereas after the government turnover in
1969 the new coalition of Social Democrats and the Liberal Party replaced almost
70 % of all officeholders (see also Dyson, 1979, p. 135; Derlien, 1984), a slightly
lower share has been replaced after the general election in 1998, when both
governing parties left office for the new coalition of Social Democrats and the
Green Party. For all other government changes, the turnover of top officials was
Table 1: Bureaucratic turnover after party changes in government, 1949–2013
1969 1982 1998 2005 2009 2013
No. of appointments 13 10 15 14 14 9
No. of positions 19 20 23 24 24 24
Turnover 68.4 % 50.0 % 65.2 % 58.3 % 58.3 % 37.5 %
Note: The length of the transition period is nine months. The figures include all administrative state
secretaries in German federal ministries.
Source: Own dataset.
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rather moderate, between 50 and 60 % of all administrative state secretaries were
sent to temporary retirement. Although these total numbers and shares do not
account for the type of dismissal and thus also include officeholders who reached
the formal pension age, the average age of those top officials dismissed after a party
change in government is not considerably lower (or higher) than the overall average
across all officeholders in our analysis.
The dataset for our analysis was constructed by collecting individual-level data
on all administrative state secretaries serving in German federal ministries. We
excluded the administrative state secretaries in the Office of the Federal President
and the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Press and Information Office, which
service no departmental ministers but the Federal President and the Federal
Chancellor, respectively. We gathered information on the individuals’ tenure,
their party affiliation and additional socio-demographic data, based upon civil
service directories, governments’ bulletins and annual handbooks as well as
biographical archives. Similarly, information on the appointing ministers was
collected from governments’ official bulletins as well as biographical handbooks
and archives.
The dependent variable in our analysis is the tenure of top officials in their first
appointment measured in days, defined as their uninterrupted first spell that may
span across several ministries and cabinets. We included all administrative state
secretaries who were appointed for the first time into this office between 1949 and
2013. The observations have been right censored if an individual administrative
state secretary did not leave office by the end of our time period of analysis when
the current grand coalition of the conservative CDU/CSU and the Social
Democratic Party took office in late 2013.
In total, 373 individuals had been appointed as administrative state secretary at
the federal ministries, experiencing 316 first spells. Although 49 individuals served
in more than one ministry during their first spell, only seven of those headed three
or more – which shows the empirically dominant portfolio orientation in German
top officials’ bureaucratic careers. Only ten individuals have been revitalised after
they had been sent to temporary retirement, thus experiencing a time gap between
their first and a subsequent spell. These revivals occur more often under recent
governments, arguably related to the more frequent changes in governing parties
after general elections since the late 1990s. However, we included those
officeholders in our analysis only with their first spell.
A first descriptive overview shows that more than a third of all administrative
state secretaries left office by the end of their fourth year, which equals the average
length of a legislative period in Germany (see Figure 1). The rest of the
officeholders stay longer in office; a larger number of senior civil servants leave
office after approx. 5.5 years.
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The independent variables related to partisan and professional determinants of
bureaucratic survival have been measured as follows (see Table 3). To identify the
party affiliation of officeholders, we followed previous research and considered not
only formal party membership but included also those individuals who had worked
in party headquarters and party bodies or for parliamentary parties prior their
appointment (see Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014). The affiliation with the minister’s party
was measured as a dummy variable. Of all administrative state secretaries in our
study, approx. 46.1 % were affiliated to the minister’s party, another 12.6 % were
affiliated to the coalition party, and 40.2 % were non-partisans; only three
individuals were affiliated to an opposition party. Regarding the group of
officeholders with discernable party ties, 86 individuals were affiliated to the
conservative CDU/CSU, 70 to the SPD, 20 to the liberal FDP and four to the Green
Party. The temporal distance between the minister’s first appointment and the
appointment date of the top official was calculated in days. A first descriptive look
reveals the high standard deviation of this variable, which is arguably related to the
variation in ministerial tenure in Germany (see Fischer et al, 2012). Therefore, we
standardised this variable by performing a z-transformation.
Figure 1: Distribution of bureaucratic tenure.
Note: Mean = 1740.61 days; standard deviation = 1187.51 days.
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The office experience of ministers was measured as a dummy variable, assessing
whether the minister held a senior public sector position prior to her appointment
(Ba¨ck et al, 2009). Similarly, the office experience of top officials was measured as
a dummy variable, determining whether the individual held top positions in federal
or state public sector organisations before her appointment as an administrative
state secretary. The descriptives of these two independent variables show that the
German federal government organisation is populated by ‘bureaucratic experts’, i.e.
approx. 72.1 % of all ministers have previous office experience in leading
ministerial departments or agencies at federal or state level. For senior civil
servants, approx. 85.6 % have previous office experience in managing bureaucratic
apparatuses before their first appointment to a federal ministry, most often as
division heads in federal ministries or as administrative state secretaries in state
ministries (Manow, 2005, p. 260). As control variables, we specified age and
gender (Table 2).
Empirical Analysis
A descriptive analysis of the party affiliation of all newly appointed administrative
state secretaries across cabinets, defined as governments led by a particular prime
minister (Lijphart, 1999), shows several dynamics over time (see Figure 2). Across
cabinets, the share of non-partisans fluctuated and dropped only under 50 % during
the 1960s and 1970s as well as during the late 1990s, in both time periods the
Social Democratic Party came into office after a longer period of Conservative
governments. In addition, no general trend emerges regarding the party affiliations
of top officials in Germany. If any, the share of non-partisans increases during the
more recent legislative periods – which may indicate that if patronage occurs, it
will be less oriented towards party affiliation and more towards personal
allegiances (see John and Poguntke, 2012, p. 132).
Moreover, the partisan affiliation of administrative state secretaries corresponds
to the coalition parties in power, i.e. after general elections with government
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of independent variables
N Mean SD Min Max
Affiliation with the minister’s party (yes = 1) 301 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Distance to minister’s first spell (days) 301 1,102.71 1,730.48 0.00 9,908.00
Minister’s office experience (yes = 1) 301 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00
Top official’s office experience (yes = 1) 301 0.86 0.35 0.00 1.00
Control variables
Age (years) 301 52.37 6.57 32.70 67.63
Gender (female = 1) 301 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
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turnover, the number of newly appointed administrative state secretaries with a
party membership of one of the two coalition parties is comparatively high. Yet,
these figures have to be further distinguished between the larger and the smaller
coalition partner, which usually form the minimum-winning coalitions in Germany.
Whereas the Liberal Party (FDP) as the smaller coalition partner of the
conservatives managed to have at best 20 % of all administrative state secretaries
with a party membership in office, the Greens, coalescing with the Social
Democrats, brought only less than 10 % of party members into the top level of
German federal ministries.
Following this analysis, one may expect a rather dynamic interplay between
partisan and other motives in bureaucratic survival in Germany. Put differently:
given the comparatively larger number of officeholders without a party member-
ship, partisan dismissal motives alone are not a convincing explanation – especially
since in principle all offices are available for partisan appointment. It is reasonable
to assume that bureaucratic survival is also related to professional characteristics of
the two actors involved.
To gauge the effects of our explanatory features on the instantaneous probability
that a top official is dismissed, we estimate different Cox proportional hazard
regressions (Cox, 1972). We censored observations if top officials survived the last
general election in 2013. The Cox approach allows us to perform the analyses by
providing sufficient estimates of the regression coefficients close to the results that
would have been generated by the correct parametric model and thus we did not
have to specify the parametric shape of the baseline hazard over time a priori (see
Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001). Cox regression assumes that hazards are
proportional over time, i.e. the effects of the covariates do not change over the time
period of our analysis. We performed a test of all covariates showing that no
variables violate this assumption.
Figure 2: Party affiliation of newly appointed top officials, 1949–2013.
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Our first model relates to the partisan determinants of bureaucratic survival and
indicates that, all else being equal, the affiliation to the minister’s party has a
significant yet positive effect on the likelihood of top officials to be dismissed (see
Table 3). In contrast to our hypothesis drawn from delegation theory and the
existing literature on bureaucratic survival, the hazard of removal is approx. 48.6 %
higher for officeholders affiliated to the minister’s party in comparison to those
lacking such a party affiliation. Put differently: top officials with a discernable
formal party congruence with their ministers have significantly shorter tenure than
those without such party congruence. By contrast, the temporal proximity between
the minister’s first spell and the appointment of the senior civil servant, which we
used as a proxy for personal allegiances, has no significant effects on the risk of
dismissal, although the coefficients show the predicted positive sign.
To provide a more intuitive presentation of the major finding emerging from
model 1 on the effects of the affiliation to the minister’s party on bureaucratic
survival, we plotted the survival function for different groups of officeholders over
time (see Figure 3). All estimations are based on model 1, with all remaining
covariates held at their means. The curve for the top officials affiliated to the
minister’s party and the curve for the non-partisans are almost identical, revealing
that we could not detect significant differences in our analysis. However, the third
survival curve of officeholders affiliated to the coalition party shows some
differences to the other two groups, especially if we consider the individuals with
longer tenure. All else being equal, 75 % of officeholders affiliated with an
opposition party stay 834 days longer in office than 75 % of their counterparts
affiliated to the minister’s party or lacking any identifiable party ties.1
Table 3: Predictors of bureaucratic tenure: Cox proportional hazard regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




























N 301 301 301
Log likelihood -1429.9 -1417.8 -1415.6
*P\ 0.05; **P\ 0.01; ***P\ 0.001.
Note: Entries are coefficients from Cox proportional hazard regressions with robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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The second model shows the results for the professional determinants of
bureaucratic survival and addresses the professional capabilities of ministers and
top officials. All else equal, the ministers’ office experience at the time of the top
official’s appointment has no significant effects, although the coefficient shows the
predicted positive sign. By contrast, the top official’s office experience has a
significant negative effect on their survival, i.e. senior civil servants with office
experience in managing bureaucratic apparatuses prior to their first appointment
have approx. 45.6 % less likelihood to be dismissed in comparison to the group of
senior officials lacking such an office experience when they have been recruited
into the administrative top jobs.
Our final model combines the partisan and professional determinants for
bureaucratic survival and supports the results of our previous two models. It shows
that both partisan and professional features maintain their relevance as strongest
and robust predictors for top official survival. All else equal, the affiliation to the
minister’s party has a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of dismissal,
i.e. top officials affiliated to their minister’s party are approx. 39.7 % more likely to
be removed than those officeholders affiliated to the coalition party, an opposition
party or those without any discernable party ties. Similarly, the office experience of
senior civil servants has a significant negative effect on the risk of dismissal:
individual officeholders with prior knowledge of how to run a bureaucratic
apparatus have approx. 32.8 % less likelihood to be dismissed than their colleagues
lacking such office experience.
Figure 3: Survival functions contingent upon party affiliation.
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By contrast, the other partisan and professional determinants show also in our
final model no significant effects. In more detail, the temporal proximity between
the minister’s first appointment and the bureaucratic appointment has no significant
influence on bureaucratic survival although the coefficient shows the predicted
positive sign. Likewise, the minister’s individual office experience in leading
public sector organisations shows no significant effect on the likelihood of
dismissal although the coefficient shows the predicted negative sign.
The analysis of bureaucratic survival of German administrative state secretaries
shows that partisan features do have an influence but also professional characteristics
of senior civil servants matter. Therefore, the patronage literature emphasising the
relevance of partisan features and the PSB perspective highlighting the competencies
and skills of actors involved are both relevant explanatory perspectives to understand
the complex nature of bureaucratic survival. It is striking, though, that both predictors
of bureaucratic survival in the German federal bureaucracy maintain their significant
effects across all models, suggesting that indeed only a combination of both can
explain the politics of bureaucratic de-selection.
The basic traits of the German federal bureaucratic elite are rather similar to
others in European parliamentary systems, i.e. they work for cabinet ministers
exercising ministerial responsibility, inter alia by selecting and dismissing top
officials, and they are formally permitted to join political parties. Therefore, our
empirical findings on bureaucratic survival at the top echelons of the German
ministerial bureaucracy present a crucial case and it is reasonable to expect that our
major findings, namely that partisan and professional determinants matter for
bureaucratic survival, are likewise significant elsewhere.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the growing literature on delegation relationships within
ministerial bureaucracies. It adds to the debates in comparative politics and public
administration research by contrasting the relevance of partisan features with
professional characteristics of the two key actors involved. Its aims to explain
bureaucratic survival in Germany and its large-N analysis of German top officials
reveal that partisan and professional features influence bureaucratic survival.
However, the top official’s affiliation to the minister’s party influences bureaucratic
survival with the opposite direction than expected by the theoretical literature on
delegation: a congruent party affiliation of administrative state secretaries and their
ministers have a significant and robust positive effect on the risk of being removed:
those individuals affiliated with their minister’s party are more likely to be
dismissed than those without such a party congruence, i.e. those affiliated to the
coalition party, to an opposition party or the non-partisans.
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Two interpretations seem plausible. First, the party congruence of top officials
and ministers matters less because of the German tradition of minimum-winning
coalitions, presuming that also party members from the coalition party satisfy
German ministers as top officials, especially if they are appointed as a mean to
exert political control over the permanent bureaucracy. Second, the plotted
survival functions of the three largest groups of officeholders, i.e. administrative
state secretaries affiliated to their minister’s party, affiliated to the coalition party
and non-partisans, show a larger difference in survival patterns for those affiliated
to the coalition party in comparison to the other two groups. This finding may
indicate the relevance of top official appointments and dismissals as additional
inter-party controls in coalition governments in Germany (see Thies, 2001).
Accordingly, ministers are restrained by coalition politics to dismiss those top
officials affiliated to their coalition partner. However, we lack more qualitative
knowledge about these dismissal events and the empirical relevance of coalition
parties therein. The institutional context requires that these decisions are put on
cabinet agendas but the dominant principle of ministerial responsibility should act
as a considerable barrier to pressures on such decisions by other ministers,
disregarding of whether they are in the same party or the coalition party.
Nevertheless, the puzzling negative effect of top officials’ affiliation to their
minister’s party is a key result of our study calling for further empirical
investigation, especially in a cross-country analysis.
More importantly, our study contrasts the explanatory relevance of such
partisan features with professional characteristics, most notably the individual
competencies and skills of the political and bureaucratic officeholders. The
analysis shows that the office experience of ministers has no significant relevance
for bureaucratic tenure. In contrast, the professional capabilities of senior civil
servants have significant and robust negative effects on the risk of bureaucratic
de-selection: those individuals with office experience have significantly lower
risks of dismissal compared to those lacking such experience in managing
bureaucratic apparatuses. Giving the considerable number of ministers with office
experience themselves, this finding also shows that ministers deliberately decide
to select and keep a second actor with profound office experience to the top level
of ministerial departments – presumably because they are aware that such
knowledge over bureaucratic structures and procedures is a key resource in
executive politics.
About the Author
Julia Fleischer is an Associate Professor at the Department of Administration and
Organization Theory at the University of Bergen. She conducts comparative
Partisan and professional control
 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810 Acta Politica Vol. 51, 4, 433–450 447
research on bureaucratic elites and the structural and procedural dynamics within
central government organisations as well as executive-legislative relations across
Europe.
Note
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